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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
EL RAY DAVIS and MERELDA ] 
V. DAVIS, husband and wife, ] 
Plaintiffs/Appellee ] 
vs. ; 
LARRY BUD JOHNSON, ARCHIE ] 
DEAN JOHNSON, MARJORIE ] 
JOHNSON and STELLA JOHNSON ] 
Defendants/Appellant] 
) APPELLANTS BRIEF 
i Civil No. 950553-CA 
I. JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from Summary Judgment in favor plaintiffs 
granted by the Fourth Circuit Court, Spanish Fork division, Utah 
County, State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
UCA §78-2a-3(2) (d) " appeals from the circuit courts, except for 
those from the small claims department of a circuit court. " 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. ISSUE Whether an easement existed in use of structures 
located on the property of Plaintiffs/Appellees in favor of 
Defendants/Appellants that was continuous in nature from its 
inception in approximately 1964. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In determining whether the trial court correctly found that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact, we view the facts 
and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the losing party. And in deciding whether the 
trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to 
the prevailing party, we give no deference to the trial 
favorable to the losing party. And in deciding whether the 
trial court properly granted judgment as a matter of law to 
the prevailing party, we give no deference to the trial 
court's view of the law; we review it for correctness. Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomauist 773 P.2d 1382,1385(Ut. 
1989). 
III. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. URCP 56(c): 
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party 
prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing 
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from an order granting Summary Judgment in 
favor of plaintiffs on the basis that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact and plaintiffs were 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (R at 17). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the 26th day of July, 1994. (R at 7). On the 
4th day of August, 1994, the defendants filed a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R at 9). On the 10th day of August, 1994 plaintiffs 
filed a Reply Memorandum. (R at 12). A hearing was held 
on the 25th day of August, 1994 and the court entered a 
minute ruling on the 25th day of August, 1994. (R at 15). 
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filed on the 15th day of September, 1995. (R at 35). 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELATED TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR 
REVIEW. 
In 1964 the Appellees' mother, Ada Johnson, owned two parcels 
of real property in Santaquin, Utah. (R at 2). After she died, the 
State sold portions of lot one and .two, while allowing the estate 
to transfer a portion to Appellees. (R at 2). The portion 
transferred to Appellees had been put to a farming use from at 
least 1964, and which was continuously used as farm land until the 
summer of 1994. (R at 2 and 10). The property deeded to the 
plaintiffs included fencing, barns, and structures for animals. (R 
at 10). The barns, fenced areas and structures were used from at 
least 1964 to 1994 to support farming on appellees!lot. (R at 10) 
The structures and use were obvious when the property was 
purchased. (R at 10). The court held that, despite the long use, 
that no easement existed in favor of defendants. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. Implied Easements are well recognized in Utah law. At 
the summary judgment hearing, there was no dispute that the four 
elements of implied easements existed with regard to this property: 
1. Unity of Title followed by severance; 
2. Obvious servitude at the time of severance; 
3. Easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the 
dominant estate; 
4. The easement is continuous and self acting. 
The only issue that existed was whether or not implied 
3 
easements are limited to passage, or whether they can be extended 
to other types of user. 
B. Implied easements are for use, and for the type of 
historic use, experienced by the property. That use may be 
recreation, passage, grazing or use of buildings, but it is 
appropriate to recognize that implied easement does exist for other 
than ingress and egress. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
THE FACTS ARE UNDISPUTED 
Rule 56(c) of the URCP allows for summary judgment only after 
two hurdles are met: (1) there must be no genuine issues of 
material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. The following facts are undisputed and 
controlling in this matter: 
1 . The barns, used for farm animals and fencing were in 
open, visible and obvious use since at least 1964 until 1994. (R 
at 10). 
2. There was unity of title in Ada Johnson for all the 
property involved in this dispute from 1964 until sheriff's sale in 
1987. (R at 2). The barns and other structures located on 
appellees' property were reasonably necessary for the farming 
conducted by Appellants on the dominant estate. (R at 10). The 
use of the easement was continuous. (R at 10). No issue of 
material fact existed. 
However, plaintiffs/appellees were not entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law because the foregoing constituted an implied 
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easement in favor of defendants/appellants. This appeal has been 
brought to confirm an easement by implication existing in favor of 
appellants for use of the property. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANTS HAVE AN IMPLIED EASEMENT OVER APPELLEES' PROPERTY 
Utah case law has long recognized implied easements. However, 
the problem before the court is whether implied easements exist for 
user other than egress and ingress. 
Two leading cases which set out the elements for implied 
easement in Utah are Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150(Ut App. 1989) and 
Tschagqeny v. Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation, 555 P.2d 
277(Ut 1976). In Butler, a restaurant was built on property owned 
by Jack Hill. Mr. Hill leased the restaurant to the defendants, 
and later built a storage unit on adjoining property. To use the 
storage units, a portion of the parking lot attached to the 
restaurant was needed to provide room to manuever boats and R.V.'s 
for parking in the storage units. This was an open and obvious use 
of the property during the term of the lease. Mr. Hill was later 
divorced from plaintiff, Mary Butler, who received the storage 
units in the property settlement. Mr. Hill sold the restaurant to 
defendants Lee. Defendants tried to limit access to the storage 
units over their parking lot area and plaintiff Butler sued to 
establish an easement over the parking lot in favor of the storage 
units. The Butler court quoted Adamson v. Brockbank, 12 Ut.2d 52, 
185 P.2d 264, 270-272(1947) as follows: 
[I]n general terms, the rule may be stated that when an owner 
of the tract of land has arranged and adapted the various 
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parts so that one derives the benefit and advantage from the 
other of a continuous and obvious character, and he sells one 
of the parts without making mention of the incidental 
advantage or burdens of one in respect to the other, there is 
implied an understanding and agreement that such advantages 
and burdens continue as before the separation of title. 
Butler 774 P.2d at 1153. 
The Tschaggenv court was asked to determine whether a land 
locked lot had an implied easement over a neighboring lot for 
passage where there was no servitude at the time of severance of 
title. The court, in discussing implied easements, stated that 
!fin such a case, the easement must be apparent, obvious, and 
visible". Tschaggenv 555 P. 2d at 280. The court further stated 
that the following four elements must be met prior to finding an 
implied easement: 
1. Unity of title followed by severance; 
2. That at the time of the severance, the servitude was 
apparent, obvious, and visible; 
3. That the easement is reasonably necessary to the 
enjoyment of the dominant estate; and 
4. It must usually be continuous and self-acting, as 
distinguished from one used only from time to time when 
occasion arises. Tschaggenv at id. 
The easement was not found for failure of obvious servitude at 
the time of severance. However, all elements of prescriptive 
easements do exist in this action. The record shows that the 
property of appellants and appellees had unity of title in the 
Estate of Ada Johnson before severance in 1987. (R at 2). At the 
time of severance in 1987, the servitude and use of the barns and 
land for livestock was apparent, obvious and visible (R at 10). 
The use of the barns and land for livestock was reasonably 
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necessary for the use of the dominant farming estate. (R at 10). 
Further, there was no dispute that this was a continuous and self-
acting use by defendants of the property from 1964 through the time 
of severance in 1987, and continueing until 1994. (R at 10). An 
implied easement should exist. 
POINT III. 
EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION IS NOT LIMITED TO PASSAGE 
The legal dispute that exists between the parties is: whether 
an easement by implication can exist when it is for user other than 
passage. Only one case on point has been found by appellants. In 
Brown v. Haley,355 S.E.2d 563(Va. 1987) the plaintiff, as the owner 
of property, had sold a portion of the property above the 800 foot 
elevation contour to Haley, who developed a campsite and water 
recreation resort next to a proposed lake to be located on Brown's 
property to the 800 feet level. The lake did not reach the 800 
foot contour level when fully filled. Therefore Haley, and those 
who used his property, had to cross and use for recreational 
activities lake-side land owned by Brown in order to be able to 
enjoy and use the lake. There was no written easement in favor of 
Haley for this use. However, the Brown court held that such use 
was "reasonable and necessary for the enjoyment of the property.". 
Brown 355 S.E. 2d at 569. The court further held that: 
When a landowner conveys a portion of his land, he impliedly 
conveys an easement for any use that is continuous, apparent, 
reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the property 
conveyed, and in existence at the of the conveyance. Brown at 
id. 
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In this matter, the estate of Ada Johnson conveyed to 
appellants property which relied upon use of the barns and 
structures was reasonable and necessary for its continued use as a 
farm. All of the other requirements for implied easement have been 
met in this matter. Based upon the facts, and the long-standing 
servitude of appellees land, an implied easement exists in favor of 
appellants for the use of the barns and other structures. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts show that the property which appellants 
received from the Ada Johnson estate had continuous, obvious and 
apparent use of barns, pigsties and fence which were reasonably 
necessary for the enjoyment of the property. An implied easement 
should therefore have been found in favor of appellants by the 
lower courts. 
DATED this S^ day of 
Richard C. Coxson 
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JOHNSON PROPERTY 
s 
SHERIFFS DEER 
NINA B REID UTAH COUHTT RECORDER 
1 9 8 ; NOV 2 4 8 1 3 3 AH FEE . 0 0 
RECORDED FOR UTAH DEPT SOCIAL 
S S > S BK 2 ^ 7 0 P6 7&i 
._ A.D. 19.8.7 .„ between Made this J5.th_ day of ......October 
D
* y . i d . . ^ . . ? * t e « a n _ _ _ Sheriff of Utah County. State of Utah, party of the flcst part, and 
l e r v l C f e l U ^ * h | - y ^ . . £ k ™ ^ J«PAtC«cnt . .pX. .5QC?i .4 l . party of the second part. 
Wlt . \BsSCTH. WHEREAS. In and by a certain judgment and decree made and entered by the District Court 
«f (he Fou-ch Judicial District ( Utah County ) of the State of Utah on the 3 r d day of March 
A.D. 1?.?7
 9 in a certain action then pending in said G « n . wherein ..Sta,tft..Ql...U.taJU^Jby.Jinri t h r o u g h — 
Utah State DepartmeAt of JSpcjlaAJ5e.raic.ts. 
Ptaintiff.....*nd . . A r c h i e . J D ^ J j ? M ^ J ) j t . . S t ^ l . « . J . Q h w l . Q R , . . 
Harjorie Jotesoa, I^rry B. ^ 
Johnson Larsen and NormaJohns cm Hansen^ _ 
.JSiU!£a%JiJrt&^ 
.._ Defendant?. 
it was among other things ordered and adjudged that ail and singular the premises in said judgment, and herein-
after described should u* sold at public auction, by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Utah County, State 
of I*tan, in the manner required by Jaw; that either of the parties to said action might become purchaser at such 
sale, .ind that said Sheriff should execute the usual certificates and deeds to the purchaser as required by law. 
AND WKERKAS. The Sheriff did. al the hour of * o'clock am, on the .. 2°.t& day of . .ApXJJL 
A.D. 1 9 8 7
 a t the west front iloor of the County Court House in Provo and County of Utah. State of Utah, 
after due public notice had been given, as required by law and said judgment, duly sell at public auction, agreeable 
t-» law and said judgment, the premise* and property in slid judgment ar*d hereinafter described at which sale said 
i»remi.«e* and property were fairly struck off uwi sold to State of Utaiu..Jby...aad^.thri)ughL«IItah ..Slate 
Department of Social Services u* the sum ot.. ..$3U5QQ~QQ. 
. . Dollars, it being the highest bidder and that being the highest sum bid at said sale. 
AND WIIKKJU* *»« ^ ? t & ? ^ * 5 & i a * 5 J - c S g f t - - J t t * ' L - 5 t t t * therB" ,0n * • « « • * • - " 
^hwifT sain sum tf muticy tm t>«£ «nw MH? shrHrr th+nrup** mmJ« ««2 tMmue* D»* usual certificate in duplicate uf 
such sale in duf farm, ami defirercd one thereof to said purchaser, and caused the other to be filed lit the office of 
the County Recorder of the Counry of Utah Stare of Utah 
A.V)> WMKRKAS. Mom lhm» *ix month* have elapsed i»inre the day .»/ *mi6 sale, mnd no redemption of the 
prwpvrty *•• *»M has IKIMI made. 
ANN WIIKHKAS. Said purcnaseT 
a* :.t»r«*<ciid diil. •»•• the day of A.D. , sell assign and transfer said Certificate 
t.f Sale ;ui<| all hi.* iiirhts thereunder *•» ~ 
the *ai«l ;tarty of* the second part, and duly authorized said Sheriff to make a deed for said premises, in pursuance 
*•( KNHI *ale !•• «*anl 
N o m vTrjlB 3nbritt l trr SttnfBHrS. Thai the said party »( the first part. Sheri.'f as aforesaid, in order to carry 
in!** «*ff«*-t *:»id >al«* in fnimuance of said judgment and **f the law. and also in consideration ot the premises and of 
th- .»...„.•> *. imi and naid by the «MI fSJi l l^'Icr'vtccs^ * n d ^ " " S ^ 1 U c a h S t a t e Department of 
lit** r.-. .n»i whereof :s hereby aekiiouledged. has granted. s»4*l. ronwyed. and by lh«**e presents does grant, sell and 
...ii\»-v .-.IHI .onftrm ••ni«* tin* *aid i*art\ ot thr jon-ond part, it* xuti*ea-»or* and assigns forever, the following desrrib-
•ti real »T4iate lying and Iwuig m **•• County *»f Utah. State of L'tah. being alt the right, title, claim 
and interest »f the ai»*te *«.-*fne>( «l**f.*n<lants «»f. in ami t»» lh»* following tlesrrihrd pro|ierty. tf»-wit: 
Com. 26j rods North of Southwest corner of Northeast i of Sec. 2, Twp. 10 South, 
Range 1 Ease, SLH; North 20 roda; East 34J rods; South 20 rods; West 34} rods 
to beg., less the home and one acre of land^on which it stands, which is exempt from this lien 
Com 
Area 4.00 seres l ss sold State Road. 
AND 
26} rods North and 114 ft. East of the Southwest corner of Northeast i of 
Sec. 2, Twp; 10 South, Range I East, SLB&M; South 57* 42' East 191 feet; North 
105 feet; West 160 feet more or less to beg. Area .19 of an acre more or less* 
The real property Is located at approximately 498 West Main, Santaqin, Utah, 
less the house and one acre of land which It stands. 
T"K«*t»**i "(th •»•) •"*• lingular the tenement*., hereditament*, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any* 
*•»•.• a).|*-n:unHtg. to have ami t*» hold the same unto said party »*( the xerond part, its success*** and assigns forever. 
IN WITNKSS \V)IKItK<>L\ Snul narly of the fin*t part lia*rttrreunt«* set his hand and seal the Amy and year first 
alMtvo written. 
Signed. Sealed n»»l l»cli\ered in pres-vtH-e « 
m yum A 
S T A T E OF UTAH. ) 
County of Utah. ) 
(SEAL) 
County. Utah 
6 t h November 1 9 8 7 On the o u " day of 
a Notary l*ublir in and for the County of Utah. 
Sheriff of Utah 
f«Mi demribed in and who executed the {^rn^rnnxs. \M\ramf:tk\t who acknowledged to me that 
n* surh Sheriff, freely and voluntarily, and for the uses and purposes therein mentioned. 
WITNKSS mv hand and notarial seal, this $ t n day of N o v e m b e r 
before me 
Kathy Zobell **;** •..„ 
State «>f I tah . personally appeared P ^ y i i a j ^ J f t S * ! * ? * . . . . -
County. Stat- of Utah, personally known t&raejto be the per* 
Mv ••mniissmn expires 4 - 1 3 - 9 1 
' Notary PuMJj 
T •fROV(rttN!HnTtH50MPAMf 255 L100 S. PR0Y0, UTAH Recorded at Request ottDFR HO a ^ o - j a ^ f t 
at M. Fee Paid $-
by . Dep. Book. 
ENT 1 * S > 5 3 BK 2 7 3 3 PG 7 ^ 0 
JUMA -^REIILUIMLIiLRFrnRnFR BY MB 
1??1 APR 24 2:45 Ptt FEE 8.50 
RECORDED FOR PROVO LAND TITLE COMPANY 
Page Ref.: 
Mail tax notice to.. .Address.. 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
[CORPORATE FORM] 
STATE DF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
, a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
, of County of UTAH , State of Utah, 
grantor, Hereby QUIT CLAIMS to EL RAY DAVIS and MERELDA V. DAVIS 
of 
Ten dollars and other good and valauble considerations 
Utah the following described tract of land in 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
Beginning at a point on the North l i n e of SR-6 Highway, said point South 2240.79 
f ee t and East 128.52 feet according to Utah Coordinate Bearings Central Zone from 
the North quarter corner of Section 2 , Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; thence North 57 deg. 00' 19" West along the North l ine of said 
Highway salong a fence 150.54 f ee t to a projected fence l i n e ; thence along said 
projected fence and fence l i n e on a l l of the following courses: North 05 deg. 41 f 
11" East 63.88 f e e t , North 01 deg. 35f 43" West 244.26 f e e t , South 88 deg. 28 ! 54" 
East 544.94 f e e t , South 00 deg. 18_f 23" East 370.24 f e e t , North 89 deg. 54f 35" 
West 222.85 fee t ; thence North 02 deg. 14' 33" West 177.44 feet along a fence and 
i t s extension; thence leaving said fence and i t s extension North 88 deg. 28' 54" 
West 190.32 f ee t ; thence South 191.63 feet to the point of beginning. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING the following: ( s e e attached) 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this day of , A. D. 19 
Attest: 
Secretary. 
[CORPORATE SEAL] 
fc JS.ta^ fiL .of.^ Utah .^.D^H^S ^  Company 
Director, Department of/SociaiPres/deWt/ 
Services , aka-^ Human Services 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Utah 
On the Z 3 ^ day of April 1991 , A. D. 
personally appeared before me Norman G. Angus 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said Mnrman r An o n c 
is the director of STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES N o r m a n ^-. Angus 
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation^; 
directors and said g *y 
each duly acknowledged to me that said corder£tionTJ 
is the seal of said corporation. 1/>? &% V A '«*:% ^ 
of a resolution of its board of 
tkfc V m e *nd that the seal affixed 
»^ 
V%c 
^ Notary Public. 
ENT1*<?33 BK 2 7 S 3 PG 7 2 1 
(continued) 
Beginning at a point in a fence line intersection on the Northeasterly line 
of the State Highway, which point is North 505.25 feet from the center of 
Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in 
Utah County, Utah; thence North along a fence line 59.00 feet; thence East 
313.30 feet along a fence line and extended line of a fence to a fence line; 
thence South along said fence line 127.00 feet to a fence line; thence West 
along said fence line 47.00 feet; thence South 108.00 feet to said Highway 
line; thence North 56 deg. 22f 20" West along said Highway line 319.20 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
Recorded at Request of_ 
at M. Fee Paid $. 
by-
Mail tax notice to-
ORDER R O ^ i ^ ^ ENT 1 ^ . 9 5 4 BK 2 7 S 3 PG " 7 2 2 H+I1«^-i«ttHff^-<e-REC0f»etrt^ MB 
1991 APR 24 2:45 Pfl FEE 9.00 
,j£LflRQED..F.QEL££Ql[aJ^Nn TTTiF COMPANY 
. Dep. Book- Page-
-Address-
Ref.: 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
[CORPORATE F O R M ] 
STATE OF UTAH, BY AND THROUGH UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
SOCIAL SERVICES 
, a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office at 
, of County of UTAH , State of Utah, 
grantor, hereby Q U I T CLAIMS to EL RAY DAVIS and MERELDA V. DAVIS 
of 
Ten dol lars and other good and valuable considerations 
the following described tract of land in Utah 
State of Utah: 
grantee 
for the sum of 
DOLLARS, 
County, 
Commencing 26 1/2 rods North of the Southwest corner of the Northeast quarter of 
Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Sal t Lake Meridian; thence North 20 
rods; thence East 34 1/2 rods; thence South 20 rods; thence West 34 1/2 rods to 
beginning. 
Commencing 26 1/2 rods North and 114 feet East of Southwest corner of Northeast 
quarter of Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence South 57 deg. 42f East 191 f ee t ; thence North 105 f ee t ; thence West 160 feet 
more or l e s s to beginning. 
LESS AND EXCEPTING the following: (see attached) 
The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be hereunto affixed 
by its duly authorized officers this day of , A. D. 19 
Attest: 
Secretary. 
[CORPORATE SEAL] 
State of Utah, D-H-S• 
.Company 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Utah 
J On the 2 3 ^ day of April 1991 , A. D. 
personally appeared before me Norman G. Angus 
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said Norman G. Angus 
is the director of STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
same and that the seal affixed 
instrument was signed in behalf of said director by authority of a resolution of its board of 
directors and said -^S^^^^^and 
each duly acknowledged to me that said J^^StH^ 
is the seal of said corporation. / - >>C, ^J 
li 
EHT14-954- BK 2 7 8 3 PG 7 2 3 
(continued) 
Beginning at a point in a fence line intersection on the Northeasterly line 
of the State Highway, which point is North 505.25 feet from the center of 
Section 2, Township 10 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in 
Utah County, Utah; thence North along a fence line 59.00 feet; thence East 
313.30 feet along a fence line and extended line of a fence to a fence line; 
thence South along said fence line 127.00 feet to a fence line; thence West 
along said fence line 47.00 feet; thence South 108.00 feet to said Highway 
line; thence North 56 deg. 22f 20" West along said Highway line 319.20 feet 
to the point of beginning. 
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which a violation of DR 9-102 resulted in a 
private reprimand. According to Delk, of 
the thirteen cases for which information 
was available, five resulted in a public rep-
rimand, six resulted in a suspension of six 
months, one resulted in a suspension of 
two years, one resulted in a suspension of 
three years, and one resulted in revocation. 
Delk points out that in the cases involving 
the three-year suspension and the revoca-
tion, the attorneys had been convicted of 
crimes. 
The information Delk has brought to the 
Court** attention suggests a need for the 
Disciplinary Board to be attentive to the 
punishment meted out in similar cases as it 
decides the appropriate punishment in an 
individual case. The majority upholds the 
three-year suspension because of the facts 
of the instant case and because the sen-
tence is within the limits that the Board is 
authorized to impose. Yet a comparison of 
the facts of this case with those of the 
disciplinary cases cited by Delk indicates 
that facts such as these have not been 
sufficient to support a penalty such as the 
one imposed here. If this last point has 
merit, then to say that Delk's sentence is 
within the limits permitted by law simply 
ignores a deeper problem of how the law 
has been applied. 
Cases of attorney misconduct are " 'spe-
cial proceedings, peculiar to themselves, sui 
generis, disciplinary in nature, and of a 
summary character.9" Maddy v. District 
Committee, 205 Va. 652, 658, 139 S.E.2d 
56, 60 (1964) (citations omitted). In Maddy, 
we explained further that disciplinary pro-
ceedings were not law suits between par-
ties, but were inquiries or inquests into the 
conduct of attorneys. The Virginia State 
Bar is an arm of the Court The discipli-
nary structure operated by the State Bar is 
meant to aid the Court in complying with 
its bask duty to preserve the integrity of 
the profession. Consequently, in discipli-
nary cases, our review is different in kind 
than in a normal appeal. Cf. Blue v. Sev-
enth District Committee, 220 Va. 1056, 
265 S.E.2d 753 (1980). In cases such as 
this, we must be concerned not only with 
the proper disposition of the individual 
^*8e; we must also be concerned with what 
» best for the overall disciplinary system. 
HALEY Va. 563 
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In the instant appeal, I perceive a prob-
lem that may affect the entire system. I 
am unable to discen^ from this record 
whether the Disciplinary Board has taken 
any precautions to insure that the punish-
ment of attorneys does not vary, without 
justification, from district to district, case 
to case, male attorney to female attorney, 
black attorney to white attorney. To pro-
tect against the foregoing, I would insti-
tute certain changes in'the way in which 
punishment is decided upon. 
I am not able, on this review, to deter-
mine what punishment would be appropri-
ate. I am able to say, however, that Delk 
has raised serious questions concerning the 
appropriateness of a three-year suspension. 
I would remind the case to the Disciplinary 
Board with directions for it to collect infor-
mation on the facts and punishment in all 
caseB involving violations of DR 9-102, in-
cluding cases in which private reprimands 
were given. I would further direct the 
Disciplinary Board to reconsider Delk's 
case and to impose a punishment which 
takes into consideration Delk's misconduct 
in the instant case, any prior disciplinary 
proceedings involving Delk, and the punish-
ment given other attorneys charged with 
similar violations. 
In my view, a process such as the one I 
have suggested would help the Disciplinary 
Board to better judge the cases that come 
before it It would also tend to make the 
administration of the disciplinary system 
more uniform. 
fO flEYNUMKRSYSTEM> 
Rufus R. BROWN 
v. 
Dayton A. HALEY, et al. 
Record No. 840346. 
Supreme Court of Virginia. 
April 24, 1987. 
After vendor of property had success-
fully brought action at law against pur-
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chasers for ejectment and damages as to 
area bordering lake, purchasers sought de-
claratory judgment that they had easement 
to cross land to reach lake waters, to re-
form deed, to declare that they had riparian 
rights to lake, and to enjoin vendor from 
further action and threats to impede their 
access to lake. The Circuit Court, Franklin 
County, James F. Ingram, J., determined 
that purchasers, their heirs and assigns, 
had implied easement to enter upon and 
cross land to reach lake. Vendor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Cochran, J., held that: 
(1) ejectment action brought by vendor of 
land was not res judicata as to purchasers' 
subsequent action for declaratory judg-
ment that they had easement to cross ven-
dor's land to reach lake waters; (2) evi-
dence was sufficient to support finding 
that use of property below 800-foot con-
tour was continuous, apparent, and in exist-
ence at time of conveyance to purchasers; 
and (3) evidence which showed that access 
to water was within contemplation of par-
ties in negotiating and entering into con-
tract for sale of property was sufficient for 
easement to arise by implication from 
preexisting use. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment «=>591 
Test to determine whether claims are 
part of single cause of action, for purpose 
of determining res judicata bar, is whether 
same evidence is necessary to prove each 
claim. 
2. Ejectment *=>1 
Ejectment is action at law to determine 
title and right of possession of real proper-
ty. 
3. Ejectment <s=>l, 95(1) 
Ejectment action is concerned only 
with ownership rights of plaintiff, and 
proof necessary to support action consists 
of documents which vest title in owner and 
any other evidence related to issue of title. 
4. Easements e»l 
"Easement" is privilege to use land of 
another in particular manner and for par-
ticular purpose; it creates burden on ser-
vient tract and requires that owner of that 
land refrain from interfering with privilege 
conferred for benefit of dominant tract. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Easements e=>38 
Privilege enjoyed under easement is 
not inconsistent with "a general property" 
in the owner of the servient Jaact 
6. Easements *»61(2) 
Establishment and protection of ease-
ment by injunction are equitable remedies, 
and proof necessary to justify equitable 
relief includes evidence of facts that give 
rise to easement, whether by express grant 
or reservation, by implication, or by other 
means. 
7. Easements «=>38 
Existence of easement is not relevant 
to issue of title. 
8. Judgment *»747(1) 
Ejectment action brought by vendor of 
land was not res judicata as to purchasers' 
subsequent action for declaratory judg-
ment that they had easement to cross ven-
dor's land to reach lake waters; none of 
evidence necessary to prove easement was 
necessary to determination of title in eject-
ment action, and had purchasers asserted 
and demonstrated easement in ejection ac-
tion, they could not have defeated vendor's 
claim of ownership of property. 
9. Deeds «=>111 
Absent express restrictions imposed by 
terms of grant, grantor of property con-
veys everything that is necessary for bene-
ficial use and enjoyment of property. 
10. Easements «=>43 
When landowner conveys portion of 
his land, he impliedly conveys easement for 
any use that is continuous, apparent, rea-
sonably necessary for enjoyment of proper-
ty conveyed, and in existence at time of 
conveyance. 
11. Easements *»36(3) 
Evidence that, when purchasers were 
negotiating purchase of property, vendors 
had already conveyed rights to land below 
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800-foot contour, land had been cleared for 
development of lake, and vendors were 
openly exercising their reserved right to 
use land below 800-foot level by grazing 
their cattle there, together with existence 
of recorded reservation running with land 
of right to use property to reach land for 
recreational purposes, was sufficient to 
support finding that use of property below 
800-foot contour was continuous, apparent, 
and in existence at time of conveyance to 
purchasers, and change in character of use, 
from grazing cattle to recreational use, did 
not preclude recognition of easement where 
use was reasonably necessary for enjoy-
ment of property. 
12. Easements «=>36(3) 
For easement to arise by implication 
from preexisting use, plaintiff must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that use is 
reasonable necessity, not absolute physical 
necessity. 
13. Easements *=>18(1) 
Existence of reasonable necessity re-
quired for easement to arise by implication 
from preexisting use depends on circum-
stances of each particular case. 
14. Easements *»36(3) 
Evidence which showed that access to 
water was within contemplation of parties 
in negotiating and entering into contract 
for sale of property and that purchasers' 
sole purpose in buying tract was to acquire 
waterfront property for recreational use, 
and that following purchase, purchasers 
developed property for such use, building 
beach, piers, docks, bathhouses and other 
facilities related to water sports and recre-
ation, was sufficient for easement to arise 
by implication from preexisting use. 
15. Easements e=>18(2) 
Where parties to land transaction con-
template that purchasers will have access 
to water for recreational purposes and 
where such access adds materially to value 
of property conveyed, use of property re-
tained for access to water is reasonably 
necessary for beneficial use and enjoyment 
* Justice Cochran prepared and the Court adopted 
the opinion in this case prior to the effective 
of property conveyed, for purpose of deter-
mining whether easement exists. 
David A. Melesco (B. James Jefferson, 
Welch & Jefferson, Rocky Mount, on brief), 
for appellant 
John S. Edwards (Martin, Hopkins, Lem-
on & Carter, P.C., Roanoke, on brief), for 
appellees. 
Present CARRICO, CJ., and COCH-
RAN,* POFF, COMPTON, STEPHENSON, 
RUSSELL and THOMAS, JJ. 
COCHRAN, Justice. 
This appeal raises questions concerning 
res judicata and an implied easement to 
cross a certain strip of land for ingress and 
egress to and from Smith Mountain Lake. 
By deed dated September 6, 1961, Rufus 
R. Brown and Sallie W. Brown conveyed to 
Appalachian Power Company (Apco) the 
right to overflow and affect with water 
that portion of a tract of 321.75 acres to 
the 800-foot elevation and to enter below 
the 800-foot contour and clear the land for 
the impoundment of water. The deed re-
served to the Browns the right to use the 
land below the 800-foot contour, as fol-
lows: 
Grantors shall have the right to pos-
sess and use said premises in any man-
ner not inconsistent with the estate, 
rights and privileges herein granted to 
Appalachian, including (a) the right to 
cross &aid land to reach the impounded 
waters for recreational purposes and 
for obtaining their domestic water sup-
ply and water for their livestock and 
(b) the> right to extend and maintain 
necessary fences across said land and 
into the impounded waters for a suffi-
cient distance to prevent livestock 
from wading around said fences. 
Moreover, the deed provided that the cove-
nants and agreements contained therein 
"shall be covenants attaching to and run-
ning with said premises." 
date of hi* retirement on April 20, 19S7. 
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By deed dated October 19, 1964, the 
Browns conveyed to Dayton A. Haley and 
Lucy S. Haley a portion of the remaining 
land described by metes and bounds and 
containing 17.26 acres, together with an 
easement of right-of-way over other lands 
of the Browns for ingress and egress. 
This tract, as described, extended to the 
800-foot elevation contour of Apco, the lev-
el to which it was expected the waters of 
Smith Mountain Lake, when filled, would 
extend. 
The Haleys built a beach, piers, a camp-
site, and a trailer park for recreational use 
of the waters of Smith Mountain Lake. 
After being filled, however, the lake rose 
to a water level that generally remains 
within the 790-foot and 795-foot contours. 
As a consequence, the Haleys' tract, adjoin-
ing the 800-foot contour, is usually sepa-
rated from the lake waters by a strip of 
land that varies in width, depending on the 
terrain and the volume of the water collect-
ed in the lake. 
In 1978, the Browns brought an action at 
law against the Haleys for ejectment and 
damages. The trial court sat without a 
jury and the evidence was not transcribed. 
By final order entered July 23, 1979, the 
court found in favor of the Browns, ruling 
that they were entitled to recover "sole 
possession" of "all the land below the 800 
foot contour as the [Haleys'] land borders 
upon Smith Mountain Lake," but denied 
the Browns' claim for damages. 
In 1982, the Haleys and others 1 filed an 
amended motion for declaratory judgment 
and bill of complaint against Apco and 
against Rufus R. Brown, who, upon the 
death of Sallie W. Brown, had become vest-
ed with sole fee simple title to their land. 
Plaintiffs asked the court to declare that 
they had an easement to cross Brown's 
land below the 800-foot contour to reach 
the lake waters, to reform the 1964 deed 
from the Browns to the Haleys, to declare 
that the plaintiffs had riparian rights in the 
lake, and to enjoin Brown from further 
1. The other plaintiffs were Ira Lewis Cooper, 
Warren H. Slone, and Warner E. and Dorothy 
Smith, all tenants of Haley's Trailer Court, and 
action or threats to impede their access to 
the lake. 
The court sustained a demurrer of Apco 
to the easement claim and motions to dis-
miss the remaining claims with respect to 
Apco; no error was assigned to these rul-
ings. Brown filed an answer in which he 
denied that plaintiffs were entitled to the 
relief sought and asserted that under the 
doctrine of res judicata the adjudication in 
the prior ejectment action barred the 
present litigation. Plaintiffs' claims 
against Brown proceeded to trial before a 
judge other than the one who had presided 
in the ejectment action. 
By letter opinion of August 10, 1983, the 
trial court stated that, although the final 
order entered in the earlier action was am-
biguous, the ejectment action decided only 
the fee simple ownership of the land below 
the 800-foot contour and established the 
boundary line between the Brown and Ha-
ley properties. Finding that the easement 
issue was not identical to the title issue 
previously resolved, the court was of opin-
ion that the present proceeding was not 
barred by res judicata. 
The court found that, at the time the 
Haleys purchased the tract from the 
Browns, the parties believed the lake wa-
ters would extend to the 800-foot contour, 
so that the Haleys thought that their land 
extended to the water's edge. In its letter 
opinion the court stated that it was "im-
plied, if not expressfly] agreed to by the 
parties," that plaintiffs had a reasonable 
expectation of reaching the lake water. 
Because plaintiffs had made substantial im-
provements based on their belief that they 
could cross the strip of land in question, 
the court stated that to deny them the 
right to cross it "would not only be ineq-
uitable but also unconscionable." Accord-
ingly, the court was of opinion that plain-
tiffs were entitled to an implied easement 
across the strip of land. After further 
argument by counsel upon Brown's motion 
for reconsideration, the court reaffirmed 
William W. Hall, described as an invitee of 
Haley's Trailer Court and member of the gener-
al public. 
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the opinions set forth in its letter of Au-
gust 10, 1988. 
By final order and decree entered De-
cember 7, 1983, the court overruled 
Brown's plea of res judicata and ruled that 
Dayton A. Haley and Lucy S. Haley, their 
heirs and assigns, have an implied ease-
ment to enter upon and cross Brown's land 
lying between the 800-foot contour line 
bordering the Haleys' property and the wa-
ters of Smith Mountain Lake as the waters 
rise and fall. The court also permanently 
enjoined Brown from taking or threatening 
any action to prevent the Haleys from exer-
cising their right to enter and cross the 
strip of land. 
In this appeal, Brown * reiterates his ar-
gument that res judicata bars the mainte-
nance of this suit because of the prior 
ejectment action involving the parties or 
their privies.3 Because his motion for 
judgment in the prior action alleged that 
the Haleys had "no interest" in the land 
below the 800-foot elevation contour, he 
contends that the existence of an easement 
over the disputed portion of the property 
was in issue and was decided adversely to 
the Haleys. Citing Bates v. Devers, 214 
Va. 667, 202 S.E.2d 917 (1974), he asserts 
that res judicata bars relitigation of any 
part of the same cause of action which was 
or could have been previously litigated and 
therefore precludes further litigation of the 
easement issue.4 We do not agree. 
[1] As Brown has noted, we said in 
Bates that a judgment in favor of a party 
"bars relitigation -of the same cause of 
actum, or any part thereof which could 
have been litigated, between the same par-
ties and their privies." 214 Va. at 670-71, 
202 S.E.2d at 920-21 (emphasis in original). 
But we explicated this language in a foot-
note: 
2. Brown died after this appeal was granted. 
Pursuant to Code § 8.01-20, we retained juris-
diction as though his death had not occurred. 
3. Although the parties to the two proceedings 
were not identical, there is no contention that 
they were not parties in privity. We will as-
sume, therefore, that this requisite of res judica-
ta is satisfied. 
The barring 
"which could 
not directed 
which might 
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of a cause of action 
have been litigated" is 
ttf\an unrelated claim 
permissibly have been 
joined, but, to a claim which, if tried 
separately, would constitute claim-
splitting. 
Id at 670-71 n. 4, 202 S.E.2d at 920-21 n. 4 
(citations omitted). The test to determine 
whether claims are part of a single cause 
of action is whether the same evidence is 
necessary to prove each claim. See Bates, 
214 Va. at 672, 202 S.E.2d at 922; Cohen v. 
Power, 183 Va. 258, 261, 32 S.E.2d 64, 65 
(1944); Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 168 
Va. 284, 290-91, 191 S.E. 608, 609-10 
(1937). Cf. Wright v. Castles, 232 Va. 218, 
223-24, 349 S.E.2d 125, 128-29 (1986); 
Feldman v. Rucker, 201 Va. 11, 18, 109 
S.E.2d 379, 384 (1959). 
[2,3] Ejectment is an action at law to 
determine title and right of possession of 
real property. See Providence v. United 
VcL/Seaboard Nat, 219 Va. 735, 744, 251 
S.E.2d 474, 479 (1979); Benoit v. Baxter, 
196 Va. 360, 365, 83 S.E.2d 442, 445 (1954). 
Jt may be maintained by one who has an 
interest in and a right to recover posses-
sion of the premises, or a share, interest, or 
portion thereof. Code § 8.01-137. A ver-
dict for the plaintiff must specify the share 
or interest of the plaintiff, whether in the 
whole or a part of the premises claimed, 
and the estate of the plaintiff, whether in 
fee, for life, or for a term of years. Code 
§§ 8.01-152, -153. The action is concerned 
only with the ownership rights of the plain-
tiff, and the proof necessary to support the 
action consists of the documents which vest 
title in the owner and any other evidence 
related to the issue of title. 
[4-6] An easement, on the other hand, 
is a privilege to use the land of another in a 
particular manner and for a particular pur-
4. Brown does not state whether plaintiffs' alter-
native requests for reformation of the deed 
from the Browns to the Haleys or for a declara-
tion of riparian rights are also barred by res 
judicata, but we construe his argument as ex-
tending to these aspects of plaintiffs' suit with 
equal force. 
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pose. It creates a burden on the servient 
tract and requires that the owner of that 
land refrain from interfering with the privi-
lege conferred for the benefit of the domi-
nant tract Bunn v. Qffutt, 216 Va. 681, 
684, 222 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1976); Tardy v. 
Creasy, 81 Va. 553, 556 (1886). The privi-
lege enjoyed under an easement is not in-
consistent with "a general property" in the 
owner of the servient tract Bunn, 216 
Va. at 684, 222 S.E.2d at 525. Establish-
ment and protection of an easement by 
injunction are equitable remedies. See 
Mobley v. Saponi, 215 Va. 643, 645, 212 
S.E.2d 287, 289 (1975); e.g., Robertson v. 
Robertson, 214 Va. 76, 197 S.E.2d 183 
(1973); Cushman Corporation v. Barnes, 
204 Va. 245, 129 S.E.2d 633 (1963); 
Williams v. Green, 111 Va. 205, 68 S.E. 
253 (1910). The proof necessary to justify 
equitable relief includes evidence of the 
facts that give rise to the easement, wheth-
er by express grant or reservation, by im-
plication, or by other means. 
[7] The existence of an easement is not 
relevant to the issue of title. In King v. 
Norfolk & W.R. Co., 99 Va. 625, 631-32, 39 
S.E. 701, 704 (1901), we held that a plaintiff 
with only a right to use the unemployed 
lands of the defendant could not maintain 
an ejectment action because his assertion 
of a right to use the land was not an 
assertion of title to any estate contem-
plated by the ejectment statutes.6 More-
over, in Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 825, 
3 S.E. 710, 714 (1887), we held that a de-
fendant's right to enter, quarry, and re-
move limestone was not a proper defense 
to an ejectment action. Where such right 
was asserted, however, the verdict should 
have been for the plaintiff, confirming title 
in him subject to the defendant's right to 
enter and quarry. Id. at 825-26, 3 S.E. at 
714-15. Finally, in Boiling v. Mayor, etc., 
24 Va. (3 Rand.) 563, 572-73 (1825) (predat-
ing the ejectment statutes), although the 
town of Petersburg held an easement for a 
highway over the land of the owner, the 
owner could nevertheless bring an action in 
5. But see dictum to the contrary in the earlier 
case of Reynolds v. Cook, 83 Va. 817, 820, 3 S.E. 
ejectment to establish his title subject to 
the easement 
[8] The easement which the Haleys as-
sert in this case cannot be proved by the 
facts which proved in the ejectment action 
that the Browns were the owners of the 
disputed property. Plaintiffs assert a qua-
si-easement appurtenant to their land re-
sulting from the express reservation in the 
flowage right and-easement deed of the 
Browns to Apco, the Browns1 use of the 
property subject to this reservation prior to 
their sale to the Haleys, and the "apparent, 
continuous, and reasonably necessary" 
character of this use of the property for 
access to the lake waters. The necessary 
proof of such an easement included the 
deed to Apco reserving a right to use the 
property for access to the water and evi-
dence of the nature of the Browns' and 
Haleys' use of the property. None of this 
evidence was necessary to a determination 
of title in the ejectment action. The two 
claims—tiie Browns' action in ejectment 
and plaintiffs' claim of an easement—were 
not part of the same cause of action be-
cause there was no identity of facts neces-
sary to prove each claim. 
Had the Haleys asserted and demonstrat-
ed an easement in the ejectment action, 
they could not have defeated the Browns' 
claim of ownership of the property. Reyn-
olds, 83 Va. at 825-26, 3 S.E. at 714-15; 
Boiling, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) at 572-73. Nor 
could the court have granted the relief they 
now seek, as it is equitable in nature and 
the ejectment action was at law. See Logo-
no v. Dozier, 91 Va. 492, 505-07, 22 S.E. 
239, 240-41 (1895) (court was powerless in 
ejectment action to reform deed where par-
ty contended that, because of mutual mis-
take, it did not reflect the intent of the 
parties). The Haleys' recourse was to file 
a separate suit in equity, as they have 
done, to have an easement declared. Cf. 
Stanardsville Vol Fire Co. v. Berry, 229 
Va. 578, 584-85, 331 S.E.2d 466, 470 (1985) 
(defendant in trespass action at law could 
resort to equity for a determination of the 
710, 712 (1887). 
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existence of an easement over the property 
at issue). Indeed, the ejectment statutes 
expressly preserve a defendant's right to 
resort to equity for any relief to which he 
is entitled See Code § 5.01-148. The Ha-
leys and their privies, therefore, are not 
barred from bringing this suit in equity to 
establish their right to cross Brown's prop-
erty to reach the lake waters and to enjoin 
Brown's interference with their use of this 
easement1 
Brown £lso contends, as he did below, 
that the Haleys are not entitled to cross his 
land below the 800-foot contour for access 
to the lake waters. He says the court 
erred in finding an implied easement from 
preexisting use, or quasi-easement, because 
certain elements necessary to a finding of 
such easement were lacking. We do not 
agree. 
[9,10] Absent express restrictions im-
posed by the terms of the grant, a grantor 
of property conveys everything that is nec-
essary for the beneficial use and enjoyment 
of the property. Middleion v. Johnston, 
221 Va. 797, 802, 273 S.E.2d 800, 803 (1981); 
Fones v. Fagan, 214 Va. 87, 90,196 S.E.2d 
916, 918 (1973); Jennings v. IAneberry, 
180 Va. 44, 48, 21 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1942); 
Scott v. Moore, 98 Va. 668, 675, 37 S.E. 
842, 344 (1900). From this principle is de-
rived the concept of an implied easement 
from preexisting use. Middleion, 221 Va. 
at 802, 273 S.E.2d at 803; Fones, 214 Va. 
at 90,196 S.E.2d at 918; Jennings, 180 Va. 
at 48, 21 S.E.2d at 771. When a landowner 
conveys a portion of his land, he impliedly 
conveys an easement for any use that is 
continuous, apparent, reasonably necessary 
for the enjoyment of the property con-
veyed, and in existence at the time of the 
conveyance. Haynie v. Brenner, 216 Va. 
722, 724, 222 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1976); Fones, 
214 Va. at 90-91,196 S.E.2d at 919; Sand-
er/tn r. Baxter, 76 Va. 299, 305 (1882). 
&e generally 1 R. Minor, The Law of Real 
Property §§ 97, 99 (F. Ribble 2d ed. 1928). 
** For the same reasons, they are not barred 
from bringing their claims for reformation of 
the deed from the Browns to the Haleys and for 
declaration of their riparian rights. Each of 
these forms of relief was equitable in nature 
Brown contends that the land in question 
had not been put to a use that was continu-
ous, apparent, necessary, and in existence 
at the time of the ^conveyance. Although 
there was some conflict in the testimony, 
the evidence of plaintiffs showed that when 
the Haleys were negotiating the purchase 
of the property, the Browns had already 
conveyed rights in the land below the 800-
foot contour to Agco. The land had al-
ready been cleared by Apco for develop-
ment of the lake, and the Browns were 
openly exercising their reserved right to 
use the land below the 800-foot level by 
grazing their cattle there. In 1964, the 
year the Haleys purchased their tract from 
the Browns, the Browns were using parts 
of their land between the 800-foot contour 
and the water for recreational purposes. 
[11] This evidence, together with the 
existence of a recorded reservation running 
with the land of the right to use the proper-
ty to reach the lake for recreational pur-
poses, was sufficient to support a finding 
that ttie use of the property below the 
800-foot contour was continuous, apparent, 
and in existence at the time of the convey-
ance to the Haleys. Even if the character 
of the use changed—from grazing cattle to 
recreational use—this change does not pre-
clude recognition of an easement where the 
use is reasonably necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the property. See Fones, 214 Va. 
at 90, 196 S.E.2d at 918; Keen v. Coal 
Company, 203 Va. 175, 179, 122 S.E.2d 
648, 647 (1961). 
[12,13] Brown asserts, however, that 
the use to which the Haleys have put the 
property below the 800-foot level does not 
meet the necessity requirement For an 
easement to arise by implication from a 
preexisting use, the plaintiffs must prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the 
use is a reasonable necessity, not an abso-
lute physical necessity. Middleton v. 
Johnston, 221 Va. at 803, 273 S.E.2d at 
803; Fones, 214 Va. at 90, 196 S.E.2d at 
918; Keen, 203 Va. at 179, 122 S.E.2d at 
and could not have been granted if sought in the 
ejectment action at law. Moreover, the proof 
necessary to sustain a claim based on each of 
these theories was not the same as that required 
in the ejectment action. 
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546; Jennings, 180 Va. at 48, 21 S.E.2d at 
771. The existence of reasonable necessity 
depends on the circumstances of each par-
ticular case. Jones v. Beavers, 221 Va. 
214, 221, 269 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1980). 
[14] In this case, the Haleys met their 
burden. Their evidence, accepted by the 
trial court, shows that access to the water 
was within the contemplation of the parties 
in negotiating and entering into the con-
tract for the sale of the property. When 
she first saw the property, Mrs. Haley dis-
cussed with Brown the soil and terrain and 
their suitability for development of a beach 
and boat landings. The Haleys' sole pur-
pose in buying the tract was to acquire 
waterfront property for recreational use. 
Following their purchase, they developed 
the property for such use, building a beach, 
piers, docks, bathhouses, and other facili-
ties related to water sports and recreation. 
The plaintiffs' evidence was that the prop-
erty was virtually worthless to the Haleys 
and their tenants without access to the 
water. 
[15] Where the parties to a land trans-
action contemplate that the purchasers will 
have access to the water for recreational 
purposes and where such access adds mate-
rially to the value of the property con-
veyed, use of the property retained for 
access to the water is reasonably necessary 
for the beneficial use and enjoyment of the 
property conveyed.7 See Ulbricht v. Fried-
sam, 159 Tex. 607, 618-20, 325 S.W.2d 669, 
676-77 (1959). The court did not err in 
finding an implied easement across 
Brown's land for access to the water. 
Worthy of special note is the case of 
Ulbricht v. Friedsam, in which the Su-
preme Court of Texas considered claims of 
parties in substantially the same positions 
as the parties in this case. There, the 
defendant's predecessor in title had grant-
ed an easement to a development company 
to overflow her land to the 1020-foot con-
tour, reserving to herself the right of ac-
cess to the water and the right to use the 
7. Cf. Jones v. Beavers, 221 Va. 214, 269 S.E.2d 
775 (1980), where plaintiffs failed to meet their 
burden of showing an implied easement in a 
landing because they offered as evidence only 
land to the water's edge. These reserva-
tions were expressly made to run with the 
land. Defendant later conveyed 386 acres, 
described by metes and bounds as extend-
ing to the 1020-foot contour line, to plain-
tiffs. Plaintiffs brought suit to try title to 
the land below the 1020-foot contour, to 
recover the right of ingress and egress to 
and from the waters of the lake, and to 
reform the deed by which the property was 
conveyed. 159 Tex. at 609-11, 617, 325 
S.W.2d at 670-71, 675. 
The court rejected plaintiffs' contentions 
that the 1020-foot contour was a meander 
line and not a boundary line or, alternative-
ly, that the plaintiffs took title to the lake 
bed between the 1020-foot contour and the 
original bank of the river that formed the 
lake as a matter of law because the deed 
described the property as adjacent to the 
lake. The court ruled that the language of 
the deed was unambiguous and did not 
convey any land below the 1020-foot con-
tour. Id at 612-16, 325 S.W.2d at 672-74. 
Turning to the question whether plain-
tiffs had an easement over the property 
below the 1020-foot contour, the court not-
ed certain facts related to the use. De-
fendant had grazed cattle on the land prior 
to its sale to plaintiffs. During their nego-
tiations, defendant represented to plaintiffs 
that the land fronted on the lake for 3% to 
4 miles. Following the sale, plaintiffs sub-
divided 20 acres along the water's edge 
into lakefront lots, and the occupants of 
these lots used the lake for boating and 
fishing without complaint from defendant 
for some time. Moreover, other parts of 
the property fronting on the lake contained 
facilities built for recreational use of the 
lake, and this condition existed and was 
apparent at the time of the sale to plain-
tiffs. Id. at 616-17, 325 S.W.2d at 675. 
Citing the law of implied easement or qua-
si-easement, the Texas court held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to recover as an 
easement the rights of defendant to use 
and enjoy the surface land below the 1020-
the documents of conveyance—deeds and relat-
ed plats—but no further proof of the circum-
stances surrounding their purchase of the prop-
erty. 
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ioot contour line, limited to the extent that 
such use was reasonably necessary to the 
use and enjoyment of the land as lakefront 
property. Id. at 618-20, 325 S.W.2d at 
67G-77.8 
Similarly, we hold that the Haleys have 
an implied easement, which runs with the 
land, to use the land of Brown below the 
SW f^oot contour for access to the water 
for recreational use. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the trial court 
Affirmed. 
(O fKYMMKRSYSTtM> 
WESTBURY COAL MINING 
PARTNERSHIP 
v. 
J.S. & K. COAL CORPORATION. 
Record No. 831660. 
Supreme Court of Virginia. 
April 24, 1987. 
Lessee of land appealed from order of 
the Circuit Court, Tazewell County, Nich-
olas E. Persin and Robert L. Powell, JJ., 
entered in favor of contractor in action to 
determine rights under mining contract 
with respect to payment of black lung ex-
cise tax. The Supreme Court, Poff, J., held 
that contract obligated contractor to pay 
the tax. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Mines and Minerals <s=>109 
Contract which obligated contractor to 
"pay all fees and taxes, required by law" 
8. Two justices dissented from that portion of the 
opinion which denied ownership of the land 
below the 1020-foot contour. Construing Texas 
law, these justices would have held that plain-
tiffs owned the adjacent property below the 
1020-foot contour to the bank of the river 
which formed the lake. 159 Tex. at 621-27, 325 
"relative to the work (excluding coal sever-
ance tax)'1 obligated contractor to pay all 
taxes related to coal mining operation other 
than the tax expressly excluded by the 
contract and obligated it to pay the black 
lung excise tax, notwithstanding Internal 
Revenue Service regulation stating that the 
tax is one imposed upon the owner of the 
coal. 
Mark M. Lawson, White, Elliott & Bun-
dy, Abingdon, on brief, for appellant 
No brief or argument for appellee. 
Present CARRICO, CJ., and COCH-
RAN,' POFF, COMPTON, STEPHENSON, 
RUSSELL and THOMAS, JJ. 
POFF, Justice. 
This appeal questions the chancellor's 
construction of a written contract 
Westbury Coal Mining Partnership 
(Westbury) is a limited partnership, and 
J.S. & K. Coal Corporation (the contractor) 
is a corporation. Both were organized un-
der the laws of the Commonwealth with 
principal offices in Richlands. By contract 
dated January 1, 1980, the contractor 
agreed to conduct coal mining operations 
on land leased to Westbury. Subsection 
18(b) of Article IV of the contract provided 
that the contractor "shall pay all fees and 
taxes, required by law, and shall comply 
with all laws, ordinances, governmental 
rules and regulations relative to the work 
(excluding coal severance tax)." The con-
tract required the contractor to furnish 
Westbury "[cjopies of all documents or 
forms [evidencing] compliance with this 
subsection". 
At that time, the federal government im-
posed an excise tax of 50 cents per ton on 
the sale of each ton of coal produced from 
underground mines. 26 U.S.C. § 4121(a)(1) 
(1982). The revenues were used to finance 
S.W.2d at 67&-S2. The dissent did not address 
the easement issue. 
* Justice Cochran participated in the hearing and 
decision of this case prior to the effective date 
of his retirement on April 20, 1987. 
